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Management Behavior—An Auditing Horizon
W. Donald Georgen
Touche Ross & C o .
T h e independent accountant has—and always had—a responsibility to look
for management fraud and illegal acts. Less clear is the auditor's responsibility to
discover these activities if they have occurred. T h e professional literature is
ambiguous, and the recent Supreme Court ruling i n the Hochfelder case did little
to resolve the uncertainty. Speaking practically, however, the profession must face
up to the expectations of the public. T h e question is not whether we have any
responsibility i n these areas—the real questions today are, h o w far does that
responsibility go, and how should the independent accountant go about executing
that charge.
W h i l e not new, this responsibility is being given considerable attention by
practitioners, academicians, and regulatory agencies, as well as the courts, because
of the sensational disclosures recently regarding implied improprieties (most of
which have not been proved conclusively), management fraud, and illegal payments. T h e public is concerned and dismayed, not only that such events could
have happened, but also that they were not detected and reported on a timely
basis. Ultimately, that concern focuses on the independent accountant. In the
public view, the independent accountant has the best opportunity (and therefore
the responsibility) to determine that proper controls are operative to prevent such
events, or where those controls fail, to timely detect and report the events. T h e
public must acknowledge that independent accountants w i l l never be able to
guarantee that all instances of management fraud and other illegal acts have been
detected—but on the other hand, it is my opinion that our detection " h i t rate"
must be substantially improved.
Attributes of Management Fraud and Other Illegal Acts
Before we attempt any analysis of the auditor's responsibility, we have to
examine the attributes of management fraud (and analogously, illegal acts). Also,
we must look at the traditional audit approach to see how it might be changed.
Fraud, very simply, is a deceptive practice—one where the perpetrator hopes
to avoid detection. ( A r m e d robbery is not a fraud, because the overt act is
obvious.) Frauds in the business environment fall into two broad categories—
those occurring at the employee level and those occurring at the management
level.
Employee frauds generally have two basic characteristics:
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— T h e object of the fraud is to convert cash or merchandise to the individual's benefit.
—The activities of the employees are or should be covered by an effective
system of internal control. Although an effective system w i l l not prevent
all acts of employee fraud, it should provide for early detection and
preclude frequent repetition.
The characteristics of management fraud are significantly different:
—Generally, fraud at the management level does not involve direct theft of
cash or merchandise; instead, it often involves "performance" fraud—the
deceptive practices result i n high reported earnings or they forestall the
recognition of a decline.
—Indirect benefits accrue to management from the fraud—salary, bonus,
profit sharing, a n d / o r value of stock options may be improved or preserved, and the likelihood of continued employment is increased.
—The fraud is likely to operate outside of established business systems and
related internal controls—in other words, the bosses are not subject to
the system.
—The nature of the deceptive act is not always apparent, for it may be
difficult to determine whether deception or error i n judgment is involved.
I would particularly like to emphasize the last two points. Management most
often has the ability to operate outside the system, simply because it is generally
the top point of control i n the system. A n d the independent accountant is often
unable to distinguish deception from an "honest mistake"—at least until subsequent discernments provide a clue to management's motives. These two points
underscore our dilemma. T h e traditional auditing approach is not really effective
against management fraud. Also, the traditional audit approach, which is independent and neutral, does not focus on the judgments necessary to evaluate the
qualitative aspects of management activity.
The Audit Approach
Given the characteristics of management fraud, let us take a critical look at
the usual audit approach. Traditionally, generally accepted auditing standards
have allowed the independent accountant to assume that management's behavior
w i l l conform to a predictable, set pattern. In other words, although he should be
alert to fraud opportunities, the auditor's primary objective is the gathering of
sufficient evidential material to form a series of judgments leading to the expression of a professional opinion on the financial statements—not the detection of
fraud. T h e auditor's conventions tell h i m to gather "enough" of the "right k i n d "
of audit evidence. Although there are conventions which give guidance to the
determination of "enough" and "right k i n d , " the auditor's judgment i n the
particular situation is the principal determinant of audit scope.
Does this suggest that the auditor's scope or approach has to be changed to
improve the fraud detection rate? T h e answer is probably yes. Does it suggest
that all audits should be performed i n the fraud mode—where you turn over
every stone and peel every grape? T h e answer is categorically N O ! T h e cost to
society would be prohibitive, given the relative number of actual frauds perpe17

trated. A n d more importantly, given a dishonest management, the independent
accountant would never be able to do enough work to satisfy himself—or anyone
else—that all acts of fraud were detected. W e simply cannot assume the total
responsibility for fraud detection, if we are to be honest w i t h ourselves and
society. However, i n the same breath I have to admit that we have to be concerned w i t h the consequences of the relatively few frauds. A n d even though we
can't catch them all, I a m convinced that we can catch substantially more than
we have i n the past.
Coping with Fraud
In my judgment, it's a matter of w o r k i n g "smarter" rather than "harder." W e
say that the auditor's responsibility i n the attest environment is to make an
"informed judgment"—and I think the way to improve detection of fraud lies
in that phrase. Further, I don't believe exponentially exploding the number of
transactions tested and accountabilities verified necessarily results i n a more
"informed judgment." Although the scope of the evidence gathering is always
important, the quality of the information gathered, how it is obtained, how it is
correlated, and the overall evaluation process are equally important i n arriving
at an "informed judgment."
O u r firm has spent considerable time and effort i n developing an approach
which we believe w i l l make us more effective i n the detection of management
fraud. T h e procedures are not new, but the emphasis is. T h e program has
basically three features; and they are all related:
—an effective client investigation program before we commence a new
engagement and a similar periodic update on continuing engagements;
—an in-depth understanding of the client's business—the economic conditions, the inherent control problems, the peculiarities of the industry; and
—concentration on material transactions—to determine their true nature
and their arm's-lengthness, and to determine the proper accounting and
the required disclosures.
Client Investigation
The client investigation feature of this approach puts emphasis on determining
the reputation of the company and, i n particular, its management. T h e questions
asked and the information gathered are intended to answer the question—is this
a company and are these people w i t h w h o m we want to professionally associate?
Is there any reason we should not associate?
Some w i l l argue that this "exclusiveness" is socially irresponsible. Some w i l l
argue that a l l public companies are entitled to the services of an independent
accountant. However, society has decreed that an independent accountant's
investigative tools are to be limited—there is no subpoena power and no right to
take testimony under oath. Instead, society has inculcated that there be a professional relationship between independent accountant and client. W i t h i n that
structure, I believe the independent accountant is entitled to accept professional
associations with care—indeed, I believe care is essential.
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Understanding the Client's Business
Understanding the business is part of the client investigation routine which
carries over into the establishment of scope or depth of the audit. Here we
concentrate o n :
— w h o is management, or who can make the business decision (Appendix
A);
— i n what roles does the management group operate (Appendix B ) ;
—what economic factors are present i n this industry—in this company—
which w o u l d be conducive to encouraging or enhancing the fraud opportunity (Appendix C ) ;
—what is the business structure, and would it facilitate or prevent the
management fraud act (Appendix D ) .
W h e n we have gathered, correlated and evaluated this information we then
identify the areas of risk and set the scope of our audit procedures relative to the
degree of risk. The evaluation is a professional judgment—but a professional
judgment based on the relevant facts. Occasionally, based on our evaluation, we
w i l l say that the business factors individually or collectively present a risk situation
which we cannot audit. In these circumstances we should—and have—withdrawn from the engagement.
Material Transactions
T h e third feature of our approach is a concentration on material transactions.
A g a i n , this part of our approach carries over from the client investigation and
our efforts to understand the client's business. W e do not pick a random selection of transactions and accountabilities and look for management fraud. Rather,
we first identify all material transactions and accountabilities and then analyze
those transactions i n depth, for management involvement and its consequences.
In the absence of direction from the profession, the regulatory agencies, or the
courts we have established the following standards of "materiality" for this
process:
—balance sheet items—measured at 5 percent of total assets
—shareholders' equity items—5 percent of total shareholders' equity
—income statement:
—sales or purchase items—10 percent of total sales or purchases
—operating income or expense items—5 percent of income before extraordinary or unusual items
—nonoperating items—5 percent of pre-tax income
W h e n we have identified a material transaction i n which management or a
related party is involved, we audit to evaluate the transaction and the nature of
the management involvement. W e study the transaction so that we can ask for
and obtain the relevant documentation—we want documentation, not conversation. W e then go one step further and request independent confirmation of the
details behind the transaction. T h i s is an important distinction from the traditional approach. W e go beyond the normal confirmation of transaction timing,
amounts involved, balances due or owing, and terms. W e specifically ask for
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confirmation of all of the facts—previous, continuing, and prospective—which
are conditions of the transaction. T h i s procedure is intended to determine if there
might be additional documentation or even unwritten understandings which override the available records.
A Professional Overview
O u r approach, although now i n effect for 18 months, as a "state of the art" is
still i n the development stage. Other firms are experimenting with their programs
under the general guidance of S A S 6 of the A I C P A on "Related Party Transactions." T h e usefulness of this approach to fraud detection w i l l evolve as we
all gain more experience. I seriously doubt if any "brand n e w " audit procedures
w i l l come out of these efforts, but the auditor's attention w i l l be directed more
explicitly. A management fraud approach must put emphasis on informed judgment, insist on substantive rather than mechanical analysis, encourage probing of
material transactions for a better understanding of the facts, and i n general
promote a "healthy skepticism."
In the late '60s and the early '70s a number of famous management frauds
surfaced. More recently, another, more wide-spread form of illegal activity has
come to the fore. The press has been full of stories of illegal political payments,
slush funds and apparent bribes. A g a i n , the public is asking, where was the
independent accountant?
Illegal Payments
As I indicated earlier, it is my judgment that this illegal payment problem is
analogous to the larger management fraud problem, insofar as it challenges the
role of the independent accountant. T h i s is true because illegal acts are often
the product of management's direct involvement or indirect forebearance because
of industry practices, economic conditions, or systems and control weaknesses.
But let's put these problems i n their proper perspective. T h e public arousal
over illegal payments and the cries for disclosure and "cease and desist" are i n my
judgment a product of the Watergate environment. Illegal payments are not a
new phenomenon on the business scene, as evidenced by present disclosures. Many
of the news stories report questionable payments, covering an extended prior
period. W h y was there not earlier concern over these practices—by the public,
the regulatory agencies and independent accountants? W h i l e many w i l l profess
ignorance—and I suspect most people were not aware of the widespread nature
of the practice and the huge sums involved—I believe that, as a result of the
concept that these payments are "accepted business practice," the problem was
generally ignored.
Without going into the developing morality or flailing ourselves for past
omissions, I am w i l l i n g to say that I believe it is our responsibility, as independent
accountants, to be satisfied that our clients' audited financial statements taken as
a whole contain adequate disclosure, and provisions for the financial effects (where
applicable) of illegal payments. In the absence of direction or standards from the
profession and the regulatory agencies, however, the specific ground rules for
accomplishing this responsibility are very unclear.
Rather than philosophize as to the ultimate direction the profession w i l l
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take, I would like to share with you the policies and practices that we have
adopted, i n our firm, to deal with the subject of illegal payments.
W e have decided that we cannot define illegal payments per se. W e say this
determination is ultimately a judicial question and an opinion—as to legality or
illegality—can only be given by competent legal counsel. W e then treat the subject
based on defined illegal payments and "possibly" illegal payments. A s i n our
approach to management fraud, we have identified possible situations where
illegal payments may be expected. T h e purpose of this initial analysis is to direct
the audit emphasis. F o r example, the independent accountant should be alert for
the possibility of illegal payments when the client sells i n countries where those
business practices are expected, or where there are substantial cash transactions, or
where there are significant "soft expenses." W e have also developed standards of
materiality i n determining the scope of our examination for such payments.
Where we have knowledge that an illegal or possibly illegal payment has
occurred, we require:
—that the matter be discussed with the client's board of directors;
—that an opinion be requested from the client's legal counsel as to the
legality/illegality of the payment, the requirements for disclosure under
the securities acts, and the form and content of that disclosure;
—consultation w i t h our national technical staff; and
—finally, an objective evaluation of all the information and the legal opinions to determine the propriety of financial presentation and disclosure,
and the impact, if any, on our auditor's report.
Although we are once again i n a "state of the art" situation without specific
direction from the profession, regulatory agencies or the courts, we believe our
program is focused on the essentials of the problem—detection and disclosure.
Some Concluding Observations
In talking with you about management fraud and illegal payments, I have
tried to avoid any suggestion that we were talking about specific procedures or
standard steps. A n d I particularly want to emphasize that we are talking about an
integrated whole. O r said a different way, we think this approach is simply a
re-emphasis of the business approach to auditing—defining the "business approach" i n the broadest possible terms.
A s a result of thinking through the approach to management fraud and illegal
payments, we have given more thought to our overall audit objective. It is
apparent that a successful audit depends on more than program details. It is
apparent that a proper attitude or philosophical audit approach is necessary. F o r
the last several years, we have summarized these "truths" i n a year-end audit
reminder to our professionals, and I would like to share them w i t h y o u :
• O u r assignment is to independently challenge and evaluate, not to rationalize.
• W h e n we say we want to emphasize the "business approach" to auditing,
we mean do the reported facts make business sense—not can we support
what management has concluded.
• O n each engagement, we have to ask the question—-are the statements
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auditable? W e have to make a rational judgment; the conclusion is not
a given assumption.
• Emphasis has to be placed on a basic evaluation of evidentiary material—
not a mechanical analysis of reported transactions and accountabilities.
• A u d i t evidence must be based on factual documentation, not conversation.
• Accounting and reporting matters are governed by generally accepted
accounting principles. In many areas G A A P parameters are fairly broad.
In the application of accounting principles we have the responsibility to
determine the appropriateness of the principles i n the circumstances.
• T h e responsibility to perform an effective audit of the facts is just as
important as the proper resolution of accounting and reporting issues.
W e have to guard against a preoccupation with the solution of accounting and reporting issues to the exclusion of the audit of the underlying
facts.
• W e need the appropriate level of audit management involved on all
audits. A significant part of the audit process is evaluative and judgmental. The skills necessary to execute these qualitative factors are
developed largely through experience. W e cannot delegate experience.
W e cannot delegate these judgments i n the critical areas of the engagement.
• T h e development of audit skills requires a basic methodology; a disciplined approach and experience. T h e methodology can be taught and
experience is a product of time and variety of engagement assignments.
Development of a disciplined approach is dependent on the environment
i n the office i n which the professional works and the perceived attitudes
and work habits of those for w h o m he works. T h e development of a
proper disciplined approach from the bottom up can happen only if we
have a properly disciplined approach at the top—in the management
group.
In my opinion, the problem of illegal payments w i l l largely disappear i n a
relatively short time. T h e public outcry, the pain and embarrassment of public
disclosure and censure, tighter corporate policies and controls, closer scrutiny by
boards of directors and others, and specific Federal regulations w i l l effectively
limit these practices.
Management fraud, on the other hand, is with us and is not going to go
away, i n the absense of any moral uplifting. T h e pressure for earnings growth
has been a catalyst for management fraud i n a stable or accelerating economy;
the pressure for survival i n uncertain economic times may be an even greater
stimulant. W e can say that other disciplines—the board of directors, the audit
committee, the public and the regulatory agencies—have a responsibility to force
management integrity. But we cannot deny our o w n responsibility. W e can say
that we can't catch them all—and this is true—but we have to catch more of
them. Some w i l l say that m a k i n g an independent accountant look for fraud is an
unreasonable burden; I would suggest to you that a properly balanced responsibility offers us an opportunity to attain top professional status.
22

Appendix A
W h o is management?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Officers
Directors
Associates
Affiliates
Trustees
Partners
Co-venturers
Principal Stockholders
Others

Appendix B
•
•
•
•
•
•

Management Involvement Role
Buyer
• Debtor
Seller
• Creditor
Guarantor
• Nominee
Lessee
• Franchisee
Lessor
• Franchisor
Forebearer
• Licensee
• Licensor
N o t intended to be all-inclusive

Appendix C
Some Conducive Economic Factors
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Insufficient w o r k i n g capital or credit
Urgent desire for good earnings to support stock price
Developing industry—massive demand for new capital
Dependence on a very few products, customers or transactions
Debt restrictions binding
A declining industry with many business failures
Company with excess capacity
Many lawsuits, especially from shareholders
Rapid expansion or numerous acquisitions, especially i n diversification
Collection difficulties from key customers, for instance, R E I T s
Inventories requiring non-auditor expertise
Long-term manufacturing cycle
Unrealistic sales projections
Obsolescence danger—high technology industry

Appendix D
Examples of Conducive Business Structure
• Dispersal of locations, documents, evidence
• Diversified company and accounting systems
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Management dominated by one or few
Divided audit responsibility
Inadequate internal audit function
Extreme mobility i n key financial positions
Mobility or lack of outside legal counsel
Constant crisis mode i n accounting function
Numerous substantive adjusting entries i n audit closing
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